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PERSONAL GROWTH AND SOCIETAL FUNCTIONING 
Richard H. Dana 
University of Arkansas 
In an incredibly short span of time we have moved from a 
traditional, lineal, relatively static, preindustrial society 
through a series of technological and ideological holocausts. 
The personality of Western Man used to be conceived as a develop­
mental unfolding within a closed system dependent upon determinism 
and to a lesser extent upon teleology. Such psychoanalytic beliefs 
were well suited to traditional civilizations in Europe and the 
United States. Suddenly, the new fact of existence was a perish­
able humanity encapsulated in a finite and diminishing universe 
of resources. Human beings were confronted with a kaleidescope 
of change and a constant necessity for adaptation. The result 
has been a continuously modulated relationship between the person 
and a variety of environments. 
Psychologists turned first to behavioristic attempts to control 
persons and environments by imposition of their technologies. Such 
behavioral innovations, however, are only effective while their 
rules and reinforcers are physically present. Ultimately, a re­
sponsible, internalized locus of control within the person is 
required to direct behavior. Some psychologists then rediscovered 
the environment and abandoned themselves to the idea that behavior 
(and personality) can be guided solely by the demand characteristics 
of the immediate situation. Generalization was not envisioned and 
fragmented parts of the person were deprived of any glue that would 
make an individual uniquely identifiable. 
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Other psychologists, however, were unable to accept the 
Newtonian view of science implied by either strict behaviorism 
or environmental determinism. A third force--humanistic theory14-~ 
perceived respect for the person as a survival quality necessitated 
by both the facts of social change and the rate of its occurrence. 
Humanistic theory emphasizes personal growth. Cognitive, affectual, 
and physical modes become alternatives in the. quest for sufficient 
flexible control in order to adapt without losing human character­
istics. A growth theme sustains an evolution of human beings in 
continuous self-renewal and self-discovery of the means by which 
to incorporate increasingly diverse, complex, and fragmented ex­
periences. This paper will describe some taproots of a human 
growth ideology and present notions on the relatedness of personal 
growth to societal functioning. 
A recent credo for providing clinical psychological services 
illustrates the consequences of focus on respect for the person3 : 
accountability by means of contracted services, phenomenological 
. 
equality of clinician and client, and an emphasis on client owner­
ship of services--ultimately through education. Thus, the "some­
thing of value" potentially contained in clinical services is 
shared and understood as a catalyst for the personal growth of 
both clinician and client4 . 
Growth apparently comes about by enhanced self-awareness 
or self-consciousness. In Rogerian terms, organismic valuing 
process transmutes experience from the phenomenal field that 
we co-inhabit into an expanding consciousness of self. Such 
experience is motivating and directive. A first implication 
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thus, is that learning about the self--from whatever experiential 
source--is power to recreate the dimensions of experience, to re­
interpret one's own locus in the phenomenal field that is the en­
vironmental circumstance. 
The Jungian archetype self moves from arcane and unconscious 
sources to become a conscious and self-conscious balance system 
and the focus of personality. Similarly, Maslow's inner coreI2_­
the perdurable shared and unique fount of humanness--is discovered, 
created, and accepted by satisfaction of deficiency and Being needs. 
Hearing and responding to oneself or one's inner voices is a mark 
of authentic selfhood and part of the self-actualization experience. 
Assagioli l posits a center for inner self-control or "will power" 
in order to enable directional, means-end activity. Since the 
self, inner core, or center are ways of conceptualizing an internal 
process whose development coincides with the experiencing of the 
phenomenal field (or environment), a second implication concerns 
an ultimate personal responsibility for one's own growth. 
Each of us presumes a lonely journey by means of an experienced 
internal process in which the flesh we cherish is only a symbol and 
a guide. A third implication is that there are substantial notions 
of how to further sign the self-expansion and self-exploration that 
have preferred to call "humanization Il5 ,6. For example, Erikson9 
provided such benchmarks in epigenetic format. We become what we 
will be from what we have been and how we live at the painful 
instant of the present. Identification of these inner foci (or 
virtues) as hope, will power, purpose, competence, fidelity, love, 
care, and wisdom provides an idiom for conceptualizing humanization. 
I 
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This language is independent of the specific experiences that 

resonate across prototypical developmental crises. 

A fourth implication sets limits upon individual human growth. 
Freedom to grow is limited by a matrix of external and internal 
constraints and by the state of consciousness at any time. We 
think of freedom and responsibility--especially responsibility 
before-the-act8--as being coupled to the existential condition 
of other persons both those we experience directly and those 
hidden from our direct regard but sharing our humanity. 
A fifth implication is that growth is future-oriented. The 
concept of a future--personal and collective--is hinged to our 
freedom within these external constraints that are components of 
our personal well-being. We cannot grow without attending to the 
future, the reasonable and fantasy-tinged extrapolations of our 
ability to be subject and object simultaneously, to bind time, 
and to transmogrify the hypothetical by fusing the inner core 
with past experience. 
A sixth implication is that growth occurs in the present. 
Essential to any apprehension of the future is attending to the 
present, being responsible for each decision as a consequence of 
personal meaning, being "fully functioning II in every feeling and 
every act, and living each minute as the only and ultimate ex­
pression of oneself. Sartre's anguish is a realization of the 
mutual dependency of freedom and responsibility in an equation of 
unknown parameters and acted upon in changing and often arbitrary 
circumstances. Because each human decision is a fulmination of 
where one has been, where one is going, and how one discovers 
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meaning in the present, it always involves transition from inertia 
to action. 
Inherent in such transitions from mass to motion are several 
opportunities for crisis. Thus, the seventh implication is that 
growth is painful and exquisitely difficult to endure. These 
crisis occasions are to be protected or to grow, to be personalized 
or to be human, to be identified or to be anonymous 7 • Human growth 
is predicated upon clear awareness of personal reality, upon belief 
in one's own intactness, and upon sharing oneself and being oneself 
simultaneously. However, personal reality is often painful and 
this pain may be alleviated by private parables. Beliefs in one's 
intactness are fragile and sometimes distorted at the expense of 
others. Anonymity is conformity in the sense of surrendering 
human obligation. 
Since there are at least these three ingredients in every 
human decision, risk is inevitable, crisis is unavoidable, hurt is 
onmipresent, and anguish is an immutable part of human experience. 
Under such conditions that we grow at all is a testimony to the . 
strength of the inner human structure and the drive, or "will" 
that may be invoked for humanization. 
An eighth implication concerns the mutual interdependence 
of growth experiences. As we grow--fitfully, intermittently, 
and for long periods seemingly not at all--we interface with the 
growth struggles of many other persons. We all contend with 
different facets of a common set of social structures--institutions 
that live by non-human rules for survival. We all compete for 
living space as though it were a commodity. Along with Dylan 
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Thomas l7 , we all "rage, rage, rage against the dying of the light", 
experiencing the violation of perishable time--more quickly consumed 
in happiness than despair. We are all caught in nets of instant 
compromise and unremitting folly. We flail and agonize and often 
cannot penetrate the mini-space and mini-time of personal circum­
stance. And we have no good nor ready words for our experiences 
of being. Encapsulated in our aging skins, we are surrounded by 
the phantasmagoric future shock of too much change, stimulation, 
and choicel8 • Seeking sensation when meaning is desired, we can 
become insensate and stultified by a rigor mortis inherent in our 
own experiences. 
Such is the transition from some concomitants of the growth 

toward self-controlled selfhood to the larger social milieu in 

which we often feel acted-upon rather than actors, controlled 

rather than responsive, and conforming rather than free. If 

human institutions cannot be enjoyed as contexts for humaniza­

tion, then we face an almost certain self-destruction. 

Since growth is affected by the person's phenomenal field 
which includes society, the central societal issue for human 
beings is contained in the phrase "quality-of-life". Maslow 
believed in a psychology of how to make Good Persons in a Good 
societyl3. Such persons may only flourish in societies that offer 
a high quality-of-life for all members. 
Quality-of-life is a. sensitizing concept relating to the 

intentions and awareness of human beings regarding their own 

social condition and their own capability for mustering environ­

mental and personal resources toward the goals of satisfaction 
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and happiness. More specifically, Harlandl2 has referred to 

quality-of-life as the state of satisfaction of essential social 

and human needs and wants represented by goods, services, situa­

tions, and states of affairs. 

In an era when many Western societies are losing the capacity 
for Utopian thinking or leaving such fantasy to social philosophers, 
science fiction writers, and futurists, the idea of quality-of-life 
is worthy of reiteration in a context of personality. In this 
context, what is "good ll for human beings becomes equated with what 
is required within a society in order to foster the most complete 
expression of the human potential, or the growth of human beings. 
In order to experience high quality living conditions, it is 
necessary to have a master social plan and the machinery for moni­
toring salient social events and rendering them into data descriptive 
of the functioning adequacy of society. Such a master social plan 
has been envisioned in this country by governmental2 and private 
groups (e.~., the Institute of the Future) and some relevant data 
has recently been publishedl9 • The Social Science Council of 
Canada and the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development have prepared similar plans. We already have a 
nomenclature exemplified by social indicators, or measures of 
discrete aspects of quality-of-life, social reporting, or the 
summarization and reporting of such indicators, and social account­
ing, or the welfare balance sheets for large areas of societyll. 
We lack consensus on specific indicators. This fact becomes one 
way of admitting that we do not know or agree upon what social 
conditions foster humanization. We do not have a political system 
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that can readily exchange economic for human goals even in the 
service of ultimate species survival. A responsible system for 
providing information, feedback, and self-conscious awareness 
by citizens would lead to more direct usages of political power 
in the interests of a more satisfactory life for all persons. 
However, the imposition of values as to what constitutes the 
"good" life is the most critical issue. Who is to do it? How 
is it to be done? 
Etzioni lO has provided one model for an active, or self­
controlling society whose values can be mediated through social 
structures in order to permit authentic living by individuals. 
Authenticity implies a balanced relationship between commitment, 
awareness, and sharing societal power. Present, post-modern 
society is inauthentic in political processes and institutions 
and inherently unstable due to blocking of recognition and 
treatment of social problems. Human beings react by alienation, 
or feeling imprisoned and powerless, and by inauthenticity, or 
feeling cheated and manipulated. Etzioni lO eloquently proffers 
a concentrated, time-limited act, a personal project that should 
be symbolic and collective to provide at least a new societal 
insight and at most a societal change: 
IIBut there are moments .•• in which each man sees the roots 
of his uneasiness, the shadows of his captors, and the 
hands of his manipulators, and he, thus, has an irreducible 
element of freedom which he can extend by commit.ing himself 
to a project {po 648)". 
• 
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Elaborating on Miller's theme15 that we can give our science 
away, Smith16 invokes new priorities for a humanized science that 
also may enhance individual freedom. Skinnerian technology is 
seen as a negation of human freedom and dignity while humanistic 
romanticism is no antidote for "strategies of disciplined inquiry". 
We need these human problem-solving strategies by applied rein­
forcement principles and we also need the belief in persons as 
responsible actors in a self-created world. Such union of head 
and heart means that a shared scientific enterprise can give 
something away that is worthwhile. 
Now to return to the credo for providing clinical psycholo­
gical services, an example that has been given substance by a 
discussion containing the following points of focus on the vital 
and awesome union of human and society: 
1. 	 Learning about the self is the source of expanding conscious­
ness. 

2. 	 Growth is a personal responsibility. 
3. 	 There are external signs of internal self-development. 
4. 	 Freedom to grow is never absolute, but is limited by both 

external and internal constraints. 

5. 	 Growth is future-oriented. 
6. 	 Growth occurs in the present tense. 
7. 	 Growth is painful and always involves risk, crisis, hurt, 

and anguish. 

8. 	 Individual growth processes interface with those of other 
persons such that mutual interdependence is the human condition. 
9. 	 Growth is affected by the person's phenomenal field which 

includes society. 
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10. 	 Societies as well as persons may be referred to as authentic, 
or fostering individual growth, or inauthentic, when individual 
growth is blocked or distorted. 
11. 	 The societal contribution to personal growth may be called 

the experienced quality-of-life. 

12. 	 High quality-of-life can only occur as an indirect individual 
consequence of a master social plan for a particular society. 
13. 	 Master social plans depend upon consensus regarding those 

conditions fostering humanization and a political climate 

that values human goals. 

14. 	 Interferences with individual growth as a result of societal 
restriction have been described as alienation or inauthenticity. 
15. 	 The recourse for the individual in the face of an inauthentic 
society is participation in order to nurture freedom by means 
of conunitment. 
-Dana 	 11 
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